The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia

(1896)

After Arabi’s revolt in 1882, the British had effectively taken control of Egypt and its holdings, including the Abyssinian port of Massowah.  In 1885, keen to divest themselves of this white elephant and to spread the burden of resisting the Mahdi, the British gave control of the port to the Italians, who were eager to create a colonial empire to rival those of their European neighbours.  Italian missionaries had been in the Eritrean region of Abyssinia since the 1850’s, and there was also an Italian commercial presence at Assab, purchased from the Egyptians in 1869.

The Italians steadily expanded into inland Eritrea, but were constantly harassed by Danakil tribesmen:  King Yohannes IV being furious at yet another invasion of his territory.  An Italian squadron landed troops at Massowah in February 1885 and, for a time, these proved sufficient to keep the marauders in check.  During a fight at Sabarguma in March 1885, for example, the appearance of an Italian observation balloon panicked the Abyssinian attackers; electric spotlights having the same effect at night.

All this contributed to a dangerous feeling of Italian superiority over their tribal opponents:  a feeling that was abruptly shattered on January 26^th 1887 when a column of 550 Italians marching to relieve the besieged garrison of Saati was slaughtered by the Abyssinians in what became known as the Dogali Massacre.  The Italians responded by sending 20,000 troops to Massowah.

The Italians responded by sending 20,000 troops to Massowah, but these troops, however, were never deployed:  Yohannes was killed fighting the Dervishes at Gallabat in March 1889 (see Part 2) and his successor, Menelik II, keen to unite Abyssinia and build up his strength before confronting any external aggressors, did a deal with the Italian invaders, signing on May 2^nd 1889, the Treaty of Uccialli (aka Wichale).  This treaty gave the Italians control of the Massowah region and part of Tigre.  The Italians consolidated:  taking Keren in June 1889; Asmara in August 1889, and deploying troops along the banks of the river Mareb.

Throughout the early 1890’s, Menelik consolidated his hold on Abyssinia and used the vast wealth generated from taxes, ivory, gold, silver, musk and slaves to arm and equip his armies with the best modern military equipment that money could buy.  Magazine-loading rifles, rifle-barrelled artillery, and plenty of ammunition all flowed to his new capital at Addis Ababa.  He also fell out with the Italians, who were now claiming that the Treaty of Uccialli actually made Abyssinia their protectorate, and effectively severed diplomatic relations with them some time in 1893.

The Italians, meanwhile, were attempting to consolidate their hold on Eritrea and Tigre.  This led to a small uprising by the Okule Basai (a tribe from the most northerly part of coastal Abyssinia) in December 1894, which was easily put down by the Italian military commander General Oreste Baratieri (who was himself just back from capturing Kassala from the Mahdists), with a Major Toselli defeating Batha Agos, leader of the Okule Basai, by arriving in his rear with a column of 1500 men and two guns as the Abyssinian besieged the 220-strong garrison of the small fort of Halai (near Saganeiti) with around 1600 poorly-armed tribesmen.

The surviving rebels fled to inland Tigre:  to Ras Mangasha, a chief who had previously been sympathetic to the Italians but had now decided to throw in his lot with Menelik after aid promised by his European “allies” had failed to materialise.  Baratieri sent an ultimatum to Mangasha:  ordering him not only to give up the rebels but also to send troops to attack the Dervishes at Ghedaref. 

Mangasha had actually been preparing an uprising against the Italians of his own:  so did not reply to Baratieri in the expected manner.  He continued to gather together his own army. 

Baratieri reacted instantly, and took 3,500 askari towards Adowa, which he captured without any sort of fight on December 28^th 1894.  Although this rapid response cowed many local leaders into submission, Mangasha remained at large.  Baratieri, his small force somewhat exposed at Adowa, retreated to the strategically well-placed Adi Ugri four days later.

Re-inforced on 12^th January, Baratieri then moved to intercept Mangasha’s army, now moving eastwards towards Coatit.  On 13^th January 1894 the two sides fought the battle of Coatit:  with Baratieri’s force of 105 Italians; four mountain guns and around 3,750 askari’s taking on Mangasha’s 12,000 riflemen (around half of them would actually have had old-fashioned muzzle-loaders) and 7,000 sword and spearmen.  Although the battle was more of a draw than a win for either side, it was Mangasha who retreated first:  Baratieri pursuing him as far west as Senafe, where the Abyssinian army melted away.  Baratieri garrisoned Tigre and returned to Massowah and then to Italy:  hailed as a hero and promising to next defeat Menelik himself.

Menelik, meanwhile, calmly gathered his feudal host:  now ready to take on the Italians himself.  He had amassing a force of around 196,000 men:  over half armed with modern rifles, and at least 34,000 of them from Menelik’s own Shoa tribe.

Hostilities opened on December 7^th 1895, with the annihilation of 1,300 askari’s under a Major Toselli by a force of some 30,000 Abyssinians in a narrow mountain pass near Amba Alagi.  Shortly afterwards the Abyssinians also besieged Makalle:  with Baratieri forced to withdraw all his men to Adigrat, where he dug in and waited to see what Menelik would do next.

The King, still keen to seek a diplomatic solution, allowed the 1,200-strong garrison at Makalle to go free after a siege lasting 45 days, and offered to negotiate with Rome.  However, the Italians refused any sort of compromise:  sending Baratieri reinforcements with which to settle the matter.

Baratieri wanted Menelik to attack his prepared positions at Adigrat, but the King outflanked him and occupied Adowa.  Baratieri withdrew further to Sauria, where his 20,000 men and 56 guns dug in anew.

Finally, with both sides now running short on supplies, on February 29^th 1896 (leap year), Baratieri advanced out of his lines to attack Menelik’s army:  stung by thinly-veiled accusations of cowardice from Rome and encouraged by his less experienced brigade commanders.

The Italian General planned to advance under cover of darkness to high ground overlooking the Abyssinian camp at Adowa:  splitting his force into three fast moving, brigade-sized columns that would re-unite to crush the enemy at daybreak (Askari’s under Albertone and Dabormida on the left and right respectively, Europeans under Arimond in the centre).  Unfortunately, the terrain to be covered had not been properly scouted, and the Italian troops were still struggling, separated, towards their objective at dawn on the 1^st.

The Abyssinians, surprised, nevertheless attacked at once:  82,000 rifle and sword armed infantry, 20,000 spearmen and 8,000 cavalry (supported by 40 quick firing mountain guns manned by Russian-trained Abyssinians) rapidly converging on Baratieri’s force of 17,700 men and 56 guns. 

The Italians were caught in their three separate columns, and although their superior fire-discipline held off the Abyssinians for some time, causing massive casualties and severely worrying Menelik, the centre and left-wing columns were overwhelmed and routed when the King, at the urging of his Empress and Ras Mangasha, committed his 25,000 Royal Guard to the battle.  Dabormida’s right-wing column had inexplicably marched away from their colleagues when battle was joined, and was overwhelmed in turn and largely annihilated.

The Italians lost around 12,000 men (over 4,000 Europeans) at Adowa:  a crushing defeat of a European force easily overshadowing the British defeat at Isandlwana.

Menelik did not follow up his victory with an invasion of Eritrea.  Some say it was because the 17,000-odd Abyssinians killed or wounded at Adowa took the fight out of the army, some say that he recognised that invading Eritrea would be a logistically very difficult task and force the Italians into a long-term confrontation that the Abyssinians would not be sure of winning. Whatever his reasons, he did force the Treaty of Addis Ababa on them:  ceding them Eritrea, but ensuring that inland Abyssinia itself was free of European influence, and allowing him to properly conquer the tribes of Kaffa and Galla to the south.

Forty years later, of course, the Italians took their revenge...

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